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1. Introduction
The Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant (Fu-NPP) accident, which occurred in March
2011, has significantly influenced the recent trend in the growing interest in nuclear reactor
deployment. On the other hand, it is common knowledge that there remain problems in
global climate changes and energy security in the long term view that human-beings are ob‐
liged to solve. Meanwhile, the issue on treatment of spent fuels (SFs) has become remarka‐
bly recognized. These facts should result in the continuous needs of nuclear energy and
proper management of SFs, i.e., well-organized nuclear fuel cycle (NFC) services, including
uranium mining, refining, conversion, enrichment, reconversion, fuel fabrication, spent fuel
treatment such as storage, reprocessing, and repository.
The concerns for the nuclear proliferation of so-called “Sensitive Nuclear Technologies
(SNTs)”, and weapon-use nuclear materials, namely, enrichment technology (frontend),
spent fuel reprocessing technology (backend) and fissile materials will increase. The latter
includes concern with worldwide increase in the amount of SFs, which may have to be stor‐
ed in individual states. Namely, there will be growing concerns from the nuclear non-prolif‐
eration and security perspectives that plutonium may globally proliferate as a form of SFs.
Measures for nuclear non-proliferation have so far been taken mainly by the combination of
institutional systems and supply side approaches (see Fig.1). International society has been
responding to the above-mentioned concerns by strengthening schematic measures centered
around the safeguards under the NPT and Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear
Material, etc. Bilateral agreements represent the latter one (supply side approach) particular‐
ly those between the US and individual states that have been functioning strongly. Howev‐
er, increase in the supply of fuel source materials from the Eastern Block has been
remarkable in recent years, as shown in Fig.2, which may potentially weaken the influence
of the Western Block on nuclear non-proliferation.
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The measures for enhancement of nuclear non-proliferation on the supply side that mainly
consist of the nuclear power technology advanced countries may interfere with the inaliena‐
ble right of peaceful uses of nuclear power that is guaranteed by Article 4 of the NPT. Thus,
there is a need to develop nuclear non-proliferation measures with high non-proliferation ca‐
pacity based on new concepts which are completely different from the conventional ones. In
addition, as for the nuclear security for handling SNTs and nuclear materials as well as safety
management of nuclear facility operations, the conventional state-by-state efforts have limita‐
tions from the viewpoints of effectiveness, efficiency, and economic reasonability.
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Figure 1. International Effort for Nudear Non-proliferation
Demand side approach represented by Multilateral Nuclear Approach (MNA), where serv‐
ices on the frontend and the backend are provided to the states possessing nuclear power
plants without interfering with the inalienable right in NPT and measures for nuclear non-
proliferation properly function, may be one of the most effective and efficient goals to solve
all the problems discussed above. Originally the MNA was proposed as an idea to reduce
the possibility of nuclear proliferation of sensitive technologies by supplying enrichment
and reprocessing services to newcomer countries [1].
Regional MNA, e.g., in Asian regions, may also complement or reinforce the weakened non-
proliferation regime of Western Block-based regions.
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Diversification of Uranium Resource SupplyFigure 2. Diversification of Uranium Resource Supply. Data source: http:/www.world-nuclear.org/info/uprod.html
In the foreseeable future, most of newcomer countries utilizing nuclear energy would like to
have a reliable system of fresh fuel supply and spent fuel treatment services, free of any po‐
litical disruptions to fuel their nuclear reactors.
Several proposals [2,3] on the Multilateral Nuclear Approach (MNA) have recently been
studied and a few are now ready to be implemented, in which no restraint of the peaceful
use of nuclear energy due to the issues of proliferation of sensitive technologies is taken into
account. Recent discussions, however, tend to focus on reliable fuel supply, namely front-
end of NFC, where proliferation of uranium enrichment can be deterred. At the same time,
the MNA capability to provide assurance/service that the SFs be managed properly is ac‐
tually more important [4].
Storing SFs as well as possessing those in power reactors in individual countries remains
problematic not only for Safety but also the risks in nuclear proliferation/Safeguards and Se‐
curity (3S), due to the presence of large amounts of imbedded plutonium (Pu). Although Pu
in SFs is protected by its high radiation dose rate, the technology to separate the plutonium
from SFs (reprocessing) is not as difficult as uranium enrichment technology. It is therefore
important to address the issues associated with the backend of the nuclear fuel cycle and to
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propose to properly manage/treat SFs. In this context, MNA may also be beneficial from the
viewpoints of 3S.
2. Historical review of international framework discussions – Past and
recent proposals concerning MNA
2.1. Historical review of international framework [5]
From the perspective of preventing proliferation of SNTs, the concept of “international con‐
trol” has been proposed for a long time.
The old one is the international control of nuclear materials, which was developed under the
Truman Administration in 1946 (i.e. pooling all nuclear materials, etc. in an international or‐
ganization and lending them to states that want them). In January 1946, the United Nations
Atomic Energy Commission (UNAEC) was founded based on the proposal by the US, the
UK and Canada in November 1945 [6] that asked the international control of atomic energy,
i.e., “control of atomic energy to the extent necessary to ensure its use only for peaceful pur‐
poses” and “elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons and of all other major
weapons adaptable to mass destruction”. In this way, MNA has been encouraged in line
with the use of nuclear energy.
In the US, “A Report on the International Control of Atomic Energy” (also known as the
“Acheson-Lilienthal  Report”)  was prepared for  discussion in the UNAEC. Based on the
Declaration on the Atomic Bomb, the Report proposed to establish a new international or‐
ganization called the “Atomic Development Authority (ADA)” which owns all fissionable
material and controls them under effective leasing arrangements [7]. The report also pro‐
posed that the ADA would be in charge of all “dangerous” activities relating to raw ma‐
terials,  construction and operation of  production plants,  and the conducting of  research
into  explosives,  while  “non-dangerous”  nuclear  activities,  such  as  the  construction  and
operation of power-producing piles, “would be left in national hands”. It is interesting to
note that in the report, all nuclear fuel cycle activities, except nuclear reactors, were cate‐
gorized as “dangerous activities” and should not be conducted by an individual state.
In 1946, Bernard Baruch, the US representative to the UNAEC, submitted his plan for the
international control of nuclear energy based on the Acheson-Lilienthal Report [8]. Howev‐
er, he modified the report by inserting the prohibition of the development of nuclear-weap‐
ons capability by new states and punishment for violations of such prohibition. The plan
was not accepted by the Soviet Union and as a result, the international control of nuclear
energy did not bear fruit in the 1940s.
This plan was later put on the table of the UNAEC in the form of “Baruch Plan” by UN
Representative B. Baruch. However, the Plan did not take off successfully because it was
contradicting with the US’s free enterprise system of that time as it was promoting inter‐
national ownership of the US technology. It  also reached a deadlock in the negotiations
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between the US and the Soviet Union. However, the Plan triggered the “Age of Interna‐
tional Collaboration for Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy” in the “Atoms for Peace” speech
by US President Eisenhower in 1953 at the UN. In this initiative,  the uranium bank (re‐
serve)  with an intension of  international  management of  fissile  materials  was proposed.
After  these debates,  the International  Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was established in
1957. Provision of nuclear materials, etc. became one of the missions of the IAEA. Howev‐
er, the uranium bank plan was eventually abandoned because a) uranium supply was not
as limited as was initially envisioned,  and b)  competition of  commercial  nuclear energy
technology/supply of nuclear materials in the major supplying states based on the above
speech was intensified.
In post-war Europe, the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) was establish‐
ed to promote nuclear energy development. The most important requirement of the EURA‐
TOM Convention was “to guarantee nuclear materials supply” by the member states [2]. At
the same time, the Convention had safeguard systems to ensure that the nuclear materials
within EURATOM were to be used only for peaceful uses.
International  debate  with  regards  to  exporting  nuclear  technology  and  material/equip‐
ment  promoted  another  international  framework  concerning  the  supply.  In  1971,  the
Zangger  Committee  was  established.  The  member  states  shall  apply  the  IAEA’s  safe‐
guards to the exported “nuclear materials” when exporting them to the non-NPT mem‐
ber states without nuclear weapons as well  as when transporting them from these non-
nuclear weapons states. The Committee also created a list of equipment as subjects of the
regulation. Meanwhile, after the first nuclear test by India, the Nuclear Suppliers Group
(NSG) was established in 1974 for a similar purpose. The NSG controls exports based on
the so-called “NSG Guidelines”, the guidelines designed for the states which export nu‐
clear  energy  related  equipment,  material  and  technologies  (it  is  a  “gentleman’s  agree‐
ment” without any legal binding power).
In 1975, the IAEA began the exploration of the first Regional Nuclear Fuel Cycle Center
(RFCC) [9] and assessed the advantages of applying backend to the RFCC. The RFCC re‐
port  examined and presented basic  research from international  and regional  approaches
regarding the backend of fuel cycle in various geographical sites. From 1977 to 1980, the
International  Nuclear Fuel  Cycle Evaluation (INFCE) [10]  was conducted,  and the effec‐
tiveness  of  nuclear  fuel  cycle  was  thoroughly  evaluated  by  8  working  groups  (WGs).
Through this activity, many WGs picked up “fuel cycle center” and described it as a sys‐
tematic  arrangement  to  strengthen nuclear  non-proliferation.  Furthermore,  for  the  spent
fuel issues, they considered the fuel cycle as a solution that includes legal framework and
multinational  arrangement.  Based on the results  of  the INFCE,  the IAEA supported the
experts group to examine the concept of international plutonium storage (IPS) [9], estab‐
lished the Committee for Assurance of Supply (CAS) [9] in 1980 and continued the delib‐
eration until 1987. The experts’ examination concluded that the multilateral approach was
technically and economically feasible but there were still  issues in terms of  difficulty in
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prerequisites  for  participation  and  transfer  of  rights  towards  nuclear  non-proliferation.
Most of those activities, initiated by the US-initiatives, could not agree on the non-prolif‐
eration commitments and conditions that would entitle states to participate in the multi‐
lateral activities” [11], because nuclear developed states in Western Europe and Japan had
already engaged in  the  development  of  their  own sensitive  capabilities.  Therefore,  they
tried to maintain their activities,  and not let them be interfered with by such initiatives.
Developing states, especially NAM states, argued that any requirements for the non-pro‐
liferation commitment of not engaging in sensitive nuclear activities were against Article
IV  of  the  NPT.  They  also  insisted  such  a  requirement  would  discriminate  between  the
“haves” and “have-nots”  of  sensitive  capabilities,  in  addition to  there  being an existing
discrimination by  the  NPT between “NWS” and “NNWS”.  The  US was  thus  left  alone
and  could  not  gain  enough  support  for  promoting  its  initiatives  any  further.  Together
with Cold War tensions, a decline in the growth rate of the US economy and a decrease
of energy demand due to the second oil shock in 1979, and discouragement of nuclear en‐
ergy use after  TMI and the Chernobyl  accidents  in  1979 and 1986,  the US itself  lost  its
motivation for MNA.
At  GLOBAL  93,  an  international  conference,  the  “International  Monitored  Retrievable
Storage System (IMRSS)” [12] was proposed by Dr. Häfele from Germany. IMRSS pro‐
posed that spent fuel and plutonium shall be stored in a retrievable condition under mon‐
itoring  by  an  international  entity.  It  chose  the  IAEA  as  a  desirable  entity  to  lead  the
initiative.  Although it  was considered a temporally measure to buy some time until  the
conclusion of whether SFs would be directly disposed or plutonium would be retrieved,
there was no development thereafter.  Dr.  A.  Suzuki of  the University of  Tokyo made a
proposal for spent fuel storage in the East Asia region, and Dr. J-S. Choi of CISAC/Stan‐
ford University made a proposal for the regional treaty including regional spent fuel stor‐
age.  Their  proposals show the significance of  the systems in which the host  states offer
interim storage of SFs for a limited time (40 to 50 years), even though the handling of SFs
from other states is not easy.
In  1994,  the  US and Russia  agreed that  the  US would  purchase  500  tons  of  highly-en‐
riched uranium (HEU) from Russia, convert it to low-enriched uranium (LEU) and make
peaceful uses of it. Furthermore, both states agreed that each state would declare 50 tons
of excess plutonium to be used for defense purposes, dismantle and retrieve 34 tons from
nuclear weapons, and convert it to power generating fuel as MOX. For the purpose of nu‐
clear  non-proliferation,  the  US also  began the  “Foreign Research Reactor  Spent  Nuclear
Fuel  Acceptance  Program (FRRSNFA)”  in  1996  to  accept  the  US-origin  spent  HEU and
LEU fuels  from foreign research reactors  by May 2009.  Furthermore,  under the Russian
Research Reactor Fuel Return (RRRFR) Program, some 2 tons of HEU and some 2.5 tons
of LEU SFs, which were previously supplied by Soviet Union/Russia to foreign reactors,
were shipped to the Mayak reprocessing complex near Chelyabinsk. The US and the Rus‐
sian Federation cooperated in several repatriation projects for Russian-origin HEU fuels.
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Based on the recognition that SFs and high level waste (HLW) are the common critical issues
which could be factors to hinder nuclear energy promotion in the East Asia region, the Pacif‐
ic Nuclear Council (PNC) began deliberation to promote understanding and cooperation for
the management of SFs and HLW among the PNC members and to investigate possibilities
of the International Interim Storage Scheme (IISS) in 1997. The IISS is managed at national,
regional, or international levels and is to augment (not to replace) the national system. The
IISS operates during the contract period from the time when SFs and HLW are deposited to
the storage facility in the host state till the time when “they are returned to the originating
state”. The host state would be responsible for safety and safeguards of the storage facility
and receive financial compensation from the contact member state, which is the owner of
the SFs and HLW.
In reality, the interim storage of SFs, a part of a reprocessing contract, had been offered by
reprocessing operators such as the BNFL and the AREVA. With this system, the state which
makes a reprocessing contract can store SFs as long as it is stored in the reprocessing facility;
however the separated plutonium and HLW at the time of reprocessing would be returned
to the state. On the other hand, the concepts of the IMRSS, the RSSFEA, regional treaty and
the IISS demand the host state to store or dispose of other state’s SF. However, this is not
easy in reality.
2.2. Recent proposalsp [13, 14]
The concerns about nuclear proliferation by states and the acquisition of nuclear weapons
by terrorists has grown after nuclear testing by India/Pakistan in 1998 and the terrorist at‐
tack on September 11, 2001. The nuclear weapons black market network issues by Demo‐
cratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, hereafter referred to as North Korea), Libya, Iran
and A.Q. Khan are driving the international society to make efforts through various trials
and proposals in preventing proliferation of the SNT related to fuel cycle such as isotope
separation and reprocessing.
The proposals made by Ex-Director General of the IAEA, Dr. M. ElBaradei, in October 2003
presented that (1) reprocessing and enrichment operations must be restricted under the mul‐
tinational control, (2) nuclear energy system shall have nuclear non-proliferation resistance,
and (3) multinational approaches shall be considered for the management and disposal of
SFs and radioactive waste. However, it was anticipated that his idea of a multilateral system
of SNTs and radioactive substances would take a long time to overcome the issues.
Former US President G.W. Bush strongly demanded in his speech at the Defense University
in February 2004 that exporting SNTs should be limited to the states which were already us‐
ing them on a full scale and respecting the Additional Protocol. However, this proposal may
lead to international cartels and may split the member states into the states with SNTs and
without SNTs. The “Nuclear Fuel Leasing” proposal by V. Rice, et al. and “Nuclear Fuel
Service Assurance Initiative” proposal by E. Moniz, et al. expect the improvement of nuclear
non-proliferation though institutionalization. However, the proposals still contain a concern
over supply assurance to the user states as well as a concern over the dichotomization of the
member states, similar to the other proposals.
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Later, a group of experts for multinational nuclear (fuel cycle) approaches (MNA) was
formed (ElBaradei Commission). The group was assigned to (1) identify and provide an
analysis of issues and options relevant to multilateral approaches to the frontend and back‐
end of the nuclear fuel cycle, (2) provide an overview of policy, legal, security, economic,
institutional and technological incentives and disincentives for cooperation in multinational
arrangements, and (3) provide a brief review of the historical and current experiences and
analysis relating to multinational fuel cycle arrangements. In the report, MNA was assessed
based on two primary factors, namely, assurance of supply and services, and assurance of
nuclear non-proliferation. Furthermore, 3 potential MNA options were presented.
i. To strengthen existing market mechanisms case by case with assistance from gov‐
ernments through long-term and transparent arrangement;
ii. To establish an international supply assurance such as fuel bank in collaboration
with the IAEA as an organization to assure fuel supply; and
iii. To promote voluntary transformation of existing facilities of member states to
MNA (including regional MNA by collaborative ownership and collaborative ad‐
ministration)
The study results by the expert group at the IAEA are summarized in INFCIRC/640, which
give an impact on the successive examination of multinational approach framework. After
this report, a number of proposals related to supply assurance and multilateral approaches
were put forward. The following are some of these proposals/approaches [15]:
1. In order to achieve “Reliable Fuel Supply (RFS) Initiative”, announced by former Secre‐
tary of the US Department of Energy (DOE), Bodman in September 2005, the US is in
the process of down-blending about 17.4 tons of HEU to about 290 tons of LEU (4.9%)
within 3 years and storing them. The RFS Initiative was later renamed to the American
Assured Fuel Supply (AFS) and it will be operational in 2012.
2. During the discussion of fuel supply assurance at the Global Nuclear Energy Partner‐
ship (GNEP), the US, in collaboration with the partner states, declared that it would
aim at  establishing a fuel  service mechanism including fuel  supply at  frontend and
SF disposal at backend to achieve international nuclear non-proliferation. In the Non‐
proliferation Impact Assessment (NPIA) presented by DOE in January 2009, the im‐
portance  of  maintaining  advanced  reprocessing  capacity  including  minor  actinide
recycling was insisted. It also emphasized the significance of the US’s participation in
the overall fuel services including backend service in order to suppress incentives for
the  emerging  states  to  individually  develop  enrichment  and  reprocessing  technolo‐
gies. Later, being influenced by political regime change, the GNEP terminated its do‐
mestic activities (i.e.  cancellation of prompt construction of commercial reprocessing
facility and fast reactor) and decided that they would maintain international collabo‐
ration  framework  as  International  Framework  for  Nuclear  Energy  Cooperation  (IF‐
NEC) only for  international  activities  from 2010.  The fuel  supply working group at
IFNEC  expressed  its  willingness  to  support  collaborative  actions  among  member
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states and organizations towards establishment of an international fuel supply frame‐
work.  It  would also provide trustworthy and worth-the-cost  fuel  services/supply to
the global market and provide options relating to the development of nuclear energy
usage in accordance with reductions of nuclear proliferation risks. The new director
expressed his speech its willingness to achieve so-called “from cradle to graveyard”.
3. World Nuclear Association (WNA) proposed a three-level assurance mechanism: 1) ba‐
sic supply assurance provided by the existing market, 2) collective guarantees by en‐
richment operators supported by relevant governmental and the IAEA commitments,
and 3) government stocks of enriched uranium product. According to them, it is neces‐
sary to promote the idea of an international reprocessing recycling center when nuclear
energy usage is expanded in the future.
4. Reliable Access to Nuclear Fuel (RANF) (nuclear fuel supply assurance concept by 6
states): Similar to the above, this proposal contains a three-level mechanism: 1) supply
through market, 2) system in which enrichment operators would substitute for each
other based on the collaboration with the IAEA, and 3) virtual or physical low-enriched
uranium banks by a state or the IAEA.
5. Japanese proposal: The states willing to participate shall voluntarily register at/notify
the IAEA of their capacities (current stockpiles and supply capacity), and the member
states shall notify the IAEA of their service provision capacity in accordance with the
availability of service utilization capability by three levels (Level 1: provision of service
on the domestic commercial basis – no exporting on a commercial scale, Level 2: inter‐
national provision on a commercial basis, Level 3: storage that can be exported for a
short time). The IAEA would make an agreement of standby-arrangement with mem‐
ber states and manage the system. If the fuel supply actually gets confused in a state,
IAEA will play a role as a mediator. This proposal is to improve market transparency,
prevent supply termination, and augment the RANF proposal.
6. UK Enrichment Bond proposal: Enrichment tasks shall be carried out by domestic en‐
richment operators. The supplying state, the consuming state and the IAEA will make a
treaty in advance. The IAEA shall approve commitment of the consuming state for nu‐
clear non-proliferation. If assurance is activated by bonding, the supplying state would
not be prevented from supplying enrichment services to a consuming state. This pro‐
posal is to enhance credibility of supply assurance mechanisms and augment the RANF
proposal. The Bond proposal was later renamed the Nuclear Fuel Assurance (NAF) pro‐
posal and was approved by the IAEA Board of Governors in March, 2011.
7. The Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) proposal [16]: This is a storage system for LEU
stockpiles possessed and controlled by the IAEA, and it is the anchor proposal for ac‐
tual realization. For the activity of the NTI, the US pledged $50 million, Norway $5 mil‐
lion, the United Arab Emirates $10 million, the EU $32 million, and Kuwait offered $10
million. The total pledge has reached $107 million. Furthermore, in April 2009, Kazakh‐
stan’s President Nazarbayev announced that the country was ready to receive the IAEA
nuclear fuel bank and officially announced its willingness to be a host state in January
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2010 (INFCIRC/782). In May 2009, the IAEA presented a proposal for deliberation at the
Board of Governors meeting held in June 2009. The proposal included consuming
state’s requirements in relation to the IAEA nuclear fuel bank, supply processes, con‐
tents of model agreement (e.g. supply price of LEU, safeguards, nuclear material protec‐
tion, nuclear liability), etc. Later, at a regular Board of Governors meeting on December
3, 2010, the establishment of “nuclear fuel bank” which will internationally manage and
supply LEU to be used as fuel for nuclear energy generation was agreed on. If the IAEA
receives a request from a state which cannot purchase LEU due to exceptional circum‐
stances impacting availability and/or transfer and is unable to secure LEU from the
commercial market, state-to-state arrangements, or by any other such means, the IAEA
will supply LEU to the state at the market price under the guidance of the Director Gen‐
eral of IAEA. Through this agreement, the first system in which LEU would be control‐
led by an international organization began. The IAEA owns the bank based on the
contributions from the member states. The Board of Directors will later deliberate the
location of the bank. Kazakhstan is already declaring its candidacy to be a host state.
The resolution was proposed collaboratively by over 10 states including the US, Japan
and Russia and was adopted with 28 states voting in favor. The developing countries
which were planning to have nuclear energy later had been insisting that the bank
would lead to a monopoly of nuclear technology by developed countries and “right for
peaceful use of nuclear energy” stipulated by the NPT would be threatened. To address
this issue, the resolution clearly stated that it would not “ask for abandoning” nuclear
technology development by each state and obtained understanding from the develop‐
ing countries.
8. International Uranium Enrichment Center (IUEC) [17]:  The IUEC was established in
Angarsk, Russia, with investment by Russia and Kazakhstan. The IUEC is not only to
assure  supply  but  to  provide  uranium  enrichment  services.  Thus,  this  proposal  is
more realistic than the others. The proposal states that the uranium enrichment tech‐
nology will  be  black-boxed,  namely,  the  investing  states  will  not  be  informed,  and
the technology will be under the control of the IAEA. Other than Russia and Kazakh‐
stan,  Armenia and Ukraine are now members of  the IUEC, while Uzbekistan is  ex‐
pressing its intention of participation. It will have the LEU reserve of two 1000MW-
level  cores.  In  May  2009,  for  the  deliberation  at  the  IAEA  Board  of  Governors
meeting held in June, Russia submitted the proposal including the summary of agree‐
ment for LEU storage between the IAEA and Russia and summary of agreement for
the LEU supply between the IAEA and the consuming states. In November 2009, be‐
ing led by Russia,  the  nuclear  advanced states  submitted a  resolution to  the  IAEA
Board of Governors in November. The resolution was to seek approval of two agree‐
ment plans: 1) agreement plan between the IAEA and Russia to establish the LEU re‐
serve under Russian IUEC, and 2)  a  model  agreement plan between the IAEA and
the LEU recipient states concerning the LEU supply from the reserve. The resolution
was  approved by a  majority.  In  March 2010,  the  IAEA’s  Director  General,  Amano,
and Director General of Rosatom Nuclear Energy State Corporation, Kiriyenco, sign‐
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ed on the agreement for the establishment of the LEU reserve under Russian IUEC,
and the LEU storage was established in December, 2010.
9. Multinational Enrichment Sanctuary Project (MESP) (proposed by Germany): This pro‐
posal is for the IAEA to manage enrichment plants and exportation on an extra-territo‐
rial basis in a host state. The SNT will be black-boxed.
10. The Science Academies of the US and Russia presented analysis and proposals for nu‐
clear fuel assurance as a measure to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons under the
title of “Internationalization of Nuclear Fuel Cycle – Goals, Strategies, and Challeng‐
es”13. In its report, the options and technological issues for the future international nu‐
clear fuel cycle are presented. The report also contains the analysis of the incentives for
the states that opt for accepting fuel supply assurance and developing enrichment or re‐
processing facilities and do not opt for it. Furthermore, they examined new technologies
for reprocessing/recycling and new reactors and made various proposals to the govern‐
ments of the US and Russia and other nuclear supplier states to stop proliferation of
SNTs and contribute to reduction in the risk of nuclear weapons proliferation. The re‐
port analyzed and summarized critical issues and presented several standards for as‐
sessing the options.
Figure 3. Transition of Proposals/Initiatives for International/Regional Management of Nuclear Fuel Cycle Relevant to
Nuclear Non-proliferation
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Figure 3. summarizes the flow of nuclear non-proliferation measures centered on multilater‐
al approach/supply assurance in the past. As shown, the debates have become more and
more active in recent years, and the need for internationalization of fuel cycle, which was
not very realistic until now, is gradually becoming a reality. As described above, as of De‐
cember 2011, the IAEA nuclear fuel bank, LEU reserve in Angarsk, Russia, and the UK’s
NFA proposal were approved by the IAEA Board of Governors, and the US’s AFS begin its
operation in 2012.
2.3. Issues with the past and current proposals
Most of the past proposed MNAs had never been implemented in any form until the nuclear
fuel bank 7) and the LEU-IUEC storage 8) were approved by the IAEA Board of Governors.
It was probably because nuclear proliferation was not recognized as a sufficiently serious is‐
sue and there was not a very strong economic motivation. Many proposals included unfair
double standards, i.e., “have” and “have not”, and inconsistency with Market Mechanism.
Also need of MNA may not have matured, or become critical yet.
However, as explained above, the situation has been changing in the last few years. Despite the
Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant accident as well as the actual global concern over nuclear
non-proliferation, the expansion of peaceful uses of nuclear energy in the world is unavoida‐
ble in the a long term. In that sense, the role of supply assurance was reviewed, and some of the
above mentioned proposals have been approved by the IAEA Board of Governors.
3. Significance of MNA
Significance of NMA, namely, MNA’s benefits and incentives of individual stakeholders
may be summarized as follows:
New nuclear non-proliferation regimes based upon mutual confidence and transparency, in‐
cluding regional safeguards, can be established, which can strengthen the function of nucle‐
ar non-proliferation.
Formulation of no discriminatory framework can be the primary incentive to make states
join MNA. Recent criteria-based approaches of export of sensitive technologies in NSG [18]
would help create a framework taking into account NPT Article IV.
Nevertheless, the number of enrichment and reprocessing facilities can be limited from the
viewpoints of their needs (capacities) and nuclear nonproliferation, although every partici‐
pating country can formally have the right to possess such SNTs.
Services on spent nuclear fuels, take-back, take-away, storage, reprocessing etc, can system‐
atically be assured. Recipient countries can enjoy such services in NMA framework.
It is also expected that the host country in MNA would be discouraged to divert nuclear ma‐
terials and to misuse related technologies because of the multilateral control of the fuel cycle
facilities.
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To minimize proliferation risks on SFs: accumulation of SFs, e.g., in power reactor user
countries, has become serious issue in the world. By leaving such spent fuel in individual
countries, there is also a certain level of risk to make such countries change the policy, i.e., to
have an incentive to try reprocessing.
Improvement in 2S (safety/security) can be expected if for NMA framework systems to deal
with such issues within the framework can be included, e.g., application of international
standards among the participating countries.
Host countries may be able to expand their nuclear fuel cycle business capabilities further
although facilities are expected to be controlled under/by MNA.
4. Prerequisites/features for establishing MNA
INFCIRC/640 (Pellaud Report) [19] proposed 7 elements of assessment called “Label” as pre‐
requisites/features. In INFCIEC/640a variety of different issues are included altogether and
the importance of each issue, such as nuclear security and safety, and political and public
acceptance, is not focused individually, even though these are contemporary topics particu‐
larly following the Fukushima nuclear accident. Therefore, the following 12 elements, name‐
ly with 5 additional Labels, can individually be described as a full set of prerequisites or
features to be considered for the formulation of a new framework of MNA as discussed else‐
where [20].
Label a: Nuclear non-proliferation
This includes safeguards, nuclear security and export control. If a state meets certain criteria
(e.g. regional safeguards under MNA, nuclear security, export control), it is considered that
the state can adequately maintain nuclear non-proliferation resume. Thus, the possession of
sensitive nuclear technologies (SNTs) (i.e. uranium enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing),
which is one of the measures for nuclear non-proliferation, would not necessarily be limited
(criteria-based approach).
Label b: Fuel cycle service
An appropriate state becomes a host state or siting state (that provides/lets site) and offers
fuel cycle service, based on the above-mentioned criteria-based approach. It includes urani‐
um fuel supply service and services on spent fuel treatment. The latter should be made with
a clear plan/agreement for long-term spent fuel treatment (storage / recycling / direct dispos‐
al), e.g., reduction of nuclear waste toxicity (HLW to medium level), individual member
states to receive final waste, and use of MOX, in order not to bring concern to host/siting
states.
Label c : Selection of a host state (siting state)
The state that meets all the criteria can be a host state or siting state. The specific criteria to
participate in the multinational framework or to be host/siting state are, for instance, to sat‐
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isfy conditions almost equivalent to the “objective criteria” described in INFCIRC 254 part
1-6, 7 (NSG guideline revised) 18, that is, member states are in full compliance with its obli‐
gations under NPT/safeguards agreement, are adhering to the NSG Guidelines, apply
agreed standards of physical protection and have committed to IAEA safety standards.
Label d : Access to technology
Particularly, the access to SNTs should be strictly controlled under the MNA Framework.
Label e : Multilateral involvement
This includes 1) having multilateral cooperative system on e.g., safeguards, safety, and se‐
curity, and 2) provision of services with or without transfer of facility ownership to MNA.
Label f : Economics
MNA, as a whole, increases economy when compared with management by individual
states.
Label g : Transport
Member states should cooperate and maintain international standards for nuclear material
transportation beyond borders.
Label h : Safety
International safety standards should be met within MNA.
Label i : Liability
MNA should cover a certain level of liability.
Label j : Political and public acceptance
Individual host or siting states should obtain political and public acceptance in corporation
with MNA.
Label k : Geopolitics
Practically it should be taken into account if the stat is geopolitically stable.
Label l ; Legal aspect
Table 1 summarizes the existing treaties and agreements that correspond to each Label to be
considered for MNA.
The gap between the new-MNA and existing related laws and agreements, which may con‐
flict in some cases, should be adjusted. In particular, new MNA framework must have equal
or higher capability on nuclear non-proliferation (Label a), e.g., in order to adjust the exist‐
ing bilateral agreement that may be one of the strongest measures among the existing non-
proliferation systems. In other words, the MNA member states must basically assure
conditions set forth in the international treaties and agreements.
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Evaluation element (label) and its contents Related treaties, agreements, etc.
a
Nu
cle
ar 
no
n-p
rol
ife
rat
ion General Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)
Safeguards Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/153)
Additional Protocol (AP)(INFCIRC/540)
Regional safeguards agreement (e.g. EURATOM, ABACC)
Nuclear material protection, nuclear
security
The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities (INFCIRC/225 Rev.5)
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (INFCIRC/274)
International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism
Export control Nuclear Suppliers’ Group Guideline for Nuclear Transfers (INFCIRC/254 Part 1)
Nuclear Suppliers’ Group Guideline for Transfers of Nuclear-Related Dual-Use Equipment,
Material and Related Technologies (INFCIRC/254 Part 2)
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540
Bilateral nuclear energy cooperation
agreement
e.g. Bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement, particularly with the US
b (Nuclear fuel) Supply assurance e.g. IAEA nuclear fuel bank, LEU storage at International Uranium Enrichment Center (IUEC) in
Angarsk, Russia.
c Selection of host states
(Only the case where Asian states are the member
states)
Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty (Bangkok Treaty) [21]
Treaty on a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in Central Asia (Treaty of Semei) [22]
Mongolia Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone
Korean Peninsula Non-Nuclear Weapon Declaration
d Access to technologies NA
e Degree of involvement in multinational initiative NA
f Economics NA
g Transportation IAEA recommendation regarding physical protection of nuclear material (INFCIRC/225 Rev.5)
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (INFCIRC/274)
Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material (TS-R-1, IAEA Transport Regulations)
A code of practice on the international transboundary movement of radioactive waste (INFCIRC/
386)
h Safety Convention on Nuclear Safety
Convention on Early Notification of Nuclear Accidents
Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency
Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive
Waste Management
i Liability Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage
Paris Convention on Nuclear Third Party Liability
Convention on Compensation for Nuclear Damage
j Political and social acceptance NA
k Geopolitics NA
l Legal regulations As shown in this table
Table 1. Existing Treaties and Agreements to be Considered for MNA
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5. An example of specific MNA framework study [21, 22, 23, 24, 25]
The author’s group has been studying an example of MNA framework, where strengthening
of international non-proliferation scheme and provision of stable energy/nuclear fuel cycle
services in a region are discussed. It contributes to enhancement of transparency and trust-
building in the region. The study investigated the schematic issues and the countermeasures
concerning the specific measures to achieve stable maintenance of the multilateral interna‐
tional nuclear fuel cycle including stable uranium supply system, spent fuel treatment sys‐
tem, usage of plutonium, establishment of regional safeguards scheme for the international
nuclear fuel cycle, requirements for an organization that carries out international nuclear
fuel cycle, and roles of industry in the international nuclear fuel cycle scheme. An image of
framework scope is given in Fig.4. Outline of the study is shown below,
Backend
Reactor Site Storage 
of SFs
Reprocessing 
International 
SF Interim 
Storage
Final Repository
Mining /Yellow Cake
Frontend
Operated by Multi-
national Consortia
Spent Fuel s (SFs)
U Fuel Fabrication
•Regional Safeguards
•Share International Guideline on 
Nuclear Safety and Security
SFs Take -
away/ back
U/Pu Fuel 
Fabrication
Fuel 
Supply
Enrichment 
Conversion 
to UF6
Including research 
to reduce radio-
toxicity 
MOX Storage 
FR / FBR 
LWR-MOX
Possible Framework of Future Nuclear Fuel Cycle
Figure 4. Possible framework of Future Nuclear Fuel Cycle
Three options on MNA system, Type A, B and C as shown below are defined.
Type A: No involvement of services (assured) of fuel supply, spent fuel storage and reproc‐
essing, but regional framework for 3S.
Type B: Provision of services (assured) of fuel supply, SF storage and reprocessing without
transfer of ownership of facilities; including regional framework for 3S.
Type C: Provision of services (assured) of fuel supply, spent fuel storage and reprocessing,
MOX storage with ownership transfer of facilities to MNA; regional framework for 3S (with
IAEA - arrangement).
Current Research in Nuclear Reactor Technology in Brazil and Worldwide294
(Specific framework proposed)
It is targeted to the Asian region
It establishes MNA Operating Organization as the core of the framework function
Conclude Treaty on Regional NFC and related Agreements between States and the Organi‐
zation.
In the multilateral framework, the system/facilities are divided into the Type A, Type B and
Type C. Plutonium-handling facilities such as reprocessing, MOX fuel fabrication, Fast Reac‐
tors, and MOX storage facilities should be controlled under type C, whereas uranium en‐
richment facility and spent fuel storage can probably be categorized as Type B or C
depending on the siting countries. LWR MOX reactor would be Type A, while direct dispos‐
al should be Type B.
Regarding SFs, the MNA consisting of host, siting, and recipient states has clear plan for
long-term spent fuel treatment, i.e., recycling / direct disposal, reduction of nuclear waste
toxicity and use of MOX, within a specific certain period in order not to bring concern to
host/siting states.
MNA develops technologies and services of reprocessing to reduce radio-toxicity of HLW
(e.g., HLW to medium level) that would make an individual member receive final disposal
waste easier.
It establishes Regional Material Accounting and Safeguards system within the MNA Frame‐
work to implement the nuclear non-proliferation regime, as described in Fig 5. The MNA
agreement contains high level of nuclear non-proliferation capability, equivalent to the exist‐
ing bilateral agreements (e.g. one with the United States).
The MNA has function to attain the international level on nuclear safety and security for fa‐
cilities within the Framework (not only for fuel cycle facilities but also nuclear power reac‐
tors); criteria and inspection system.
The MNA has agreement with technology holders to precisely manage and control the SNTs
(limited to technology-holding operators only).
Obligation with regards to nuclear non-proliferation is performed equally by the member
states, while it is guaranteed that the right of peaceful uses of nuclear energy pursuant to
Article 4 of NPT is not interfered with.
The specific requirement to participate in the multilateral framework is to satisfy conditions
almost equivalent to the “objective criteria” described in INFCIRC 254 part 1, 6-7 (NSG
Guidelines revised in 2011, see below*).
The MNA Framework is to be more economically advantageous than the fuel service on per
state basis.
Framework member states cooperate on and agree to "transport” with regards to the nuclear
fuel cycle service.
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Liability for compensation of damages at a possible level is agreed to within the Framework.
The member states cooperate in efforts to obtain public consensus in host and siting states.
Any legal regulation to be inconsistent with, or antagonistic to, existing international rules,
bilateral agreements, etc. is cleared.
Framework meets the recent Nuclear Industries’ recognition on Safety, Health and Radiation
Protection;  Physical  Security;  Environmental  Protection and Handling of  Spent Fuel  and
Wastes; Compensation for Nuclear Damage; Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Safeguards; and
Ethics, as described in “Principle of Conduct” for nuclear power plant exporters [26], where
the plant manufactures (=Venders) should consider when exporting nuclear products.
IAEA MNA
Nuclear Facilities (MNA’s)
Accounting Reports
Created by
MNA’s Operators
Joint
Verification
Activities
Accounting Reports
checked by MNA
Type C
IAEA MNA
Nuclear Facilities
Accounting Reports 
Created by
Facility’s Operators
Joint
Verification
Activities
Accounting Reports
checked by 
State and MNA
Type A & B
Regional Safeguards SystemFigure 5. Regional Safeguard System
[NSG Guidelines* (INFCIRC/Rev.10/Part.1, 26 July 2011)[18]
NSG members would not authorize transfers of enrichment and reprocessing technology unless the intended
recipient met certain “objective” criteria:
Be party to the NPT and in full compliance with the treaty,
Has not been identified in a report by the IAEA Secretariat which is under consideration by the IAEA Board of
Governors, as being in breach of its obligations to comply with its safeguards agreement, nor continues to be the
subject of Board of Governors decisions calling upon it to take additional steps to comply with its safeguards
obligations or to build confidence in the peaceful nature of its nuclear program, nor has been reported by the IAEA,
Is adhering to the NSG Guidelines and has reported to the Security Council of the United Nations that it is
implementing effective export controls as identified by Security Council Resolution 1540,
Has concluded an inter-governmental agreement with the supplier including assurances regarding non-explosive use,
effective safeguards in perpetuity, and retransfer,
Has made a commitment to the supplier to apply mutually agreed standards of physical protection based on current
international guidelines, and
Has committed to IAEA safety standards and adheres to accepted international safety conventions.
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The outline of the management structure for the framework to meet the proposed concept is
given in Fig. 6, where a basic treaty and many agreements on export, fuel supply, safety, se‐
curity, safeguards, transfer of facility, SF services, sensitive technology control needs to be
concluded among member states, and between state and AMNAO, technology holder and
AMNAO, IAEA (and/or other international organization) and AMNAO. Also support of
IAEA is essential for establishment of such international framework and system.
Support for MNA 
Foundation
• Agreement on export control *1, *2, *3
• Agreement on  nuclear fuel supplies *1, *2
• Agreement  on management & operation of Host States’ facilities *1 /MNA facilities *2
• Agreement on nuclear safety, security and nuclear liability *1, *2 , *3
• Agreement on  transfer of MNA facilities *2
• Agreement on nuclear fuel cycle services *1, *2 , *3
Treaty / Agreements needed for the Foundation of 
MNA Model - Structure
Partner States*3
Type B Type C Type A,B,C 
Host States*1
Cooperative Industrial 
Consortia
Member States
MNA Cooperative 
Industrial Consortia
Siting States*2
Agreement on Supply Assurance 
and Additional Assurance
Safeguards Agreement
Agreement on Sensitive 
Technology Control
MNA Regional Safeguards, Nuclear Security 
and Safety Control Center (AMNAO-3SCC)
Asian MNA Operating Organization (AMNAO) 
International Organization IAEA Technology Holder（State）
IAEA
Treaty on the 
Regional 
Nuclear Fuel 
Cycle Services
Contract Contract
Figure 6. Treaty/Agreements Needed for the Foundation of MNA Model Structure
The treaty on the Regional Nuclear Fuel Cycle may consist of the following articles:
Preamble: Objective, Scope, Definition, Rights and Obligation, Signors
Article 1: Promotion of Foundation and Operation of Cooperative Industrial Consortia
Article 2: Limitation of commercial use, Obligation for Cooperative Industrial Consortia
Article 3: Industrial Rights Article 4: Sensitive Technology
Article 5: Safeguards Article 6: Resolution of Dispute
Article 7: Nuclear Security and safety Article 8: Withdrawal
Article 9: Licensing Article 10: Transport
Ending Part Protocol, Attached Documents
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An example of specific Asia region MNA cooperation is shown in Fig. 7, which may comple‐
ment or even reinforce the present non-proliferation regime. At the same time, the new pro‐
posed scheme may enable the region to have international storage of SFs and MOX.
8
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Natural
Uranium
U Fuel Fabrication in Asia
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U Refine, conversion
Fast Reactor Type C
LWR MOX: Type A or B
MOX Storage
Regional SF Long Term 
Storage at
States of U Origin 
(Type B or C)
States in Asian having 
abundant U resource 
All states 
with NPP 
Other Low 
Enriched U 
(Fuel) outside 
Asia 
(Type C)
(Type C)
U Enrichment 
An Example of Potential MNA Cooperation in Asia Region
(Type A or B) (Type A or B)(Type B or C)
(Type A)
Figure 7. An Example of Potential MNA Cooperation in Asia Region
6. Future perspective and challenges on MNA
As discussed in Section 5, many prerequisites/features (Label a-l) have to be studied in order
to establish a feasible and sustainable “Multilateral Approach Framework of Nuclear Fuel
Cycle”. Even if a proposal enables the fulfillment of all the prerequisites/features including
equal right for peaceful use of nuclear energy, furthermore, remaining challenges may be
how to make states have incentives toward or be attracted to the proposed MNA.
As shown in Section 2, EURATOM as a regional MNA was successfully established in the
post-war. An incentive for European states to participate in EURATOM was to securely ac‐
quire source materials for nuclear energy development [2] due to the presence of the risk of
shortage of energy source, although their Convention included safeguards systems to en‐
sure that the nuclear materials to be used only for peaceful purpose.
The priorities for the above-shown example study are the following: “to eliminate inequality
from the perspective of peaceful uses of nuclear power”, “involvement of industry”, “to
have nuclear non-proliferation capacity of the current or higher level (including political
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and geopolitical perspectives)”, “to realize international standards for safety and security”,
“to have higher economic potential for fuel cycle than a single state approach”, “to eliminate
conflicts/inconsistency with existing laws and regulations”, and “to solve transport issues of
nuclear fuel, etc”. Particularly, involvement of industry would be a key issue when such in‐
centive or attractiveness of the new proposal is discussed. Probably, nuclear societies includ‐
ing industry have internationally received greater recognition of the importance in Safety,
Health and Radiation Protection; Physical Security; Environmental Protection and Handling
of Spent Fuels and Wastes; Compensation for Nuclear Damage; Nuclear Non-Proliferation
and Safeguards and Ethics, as described by Principle of Conduct [28], since the Fukushima
Power Plant Accident.
Taking into account the example of EURATOM, the need of MNA for participants is the
overriding issue in having “incentive” towards establishment of MNA. The author would
like to note that the environment is getting ripe for the need of MNA, in terms of SF and
waste treatment, maintenance and improvement in safety, security and nuclear non-prolifer‐
ation-safeguards (3S).
There are still many challenges, pursuing incentives on economic efficiency, 3S, finding the
solutions for nuclear material transportation within MNA, effective and efficient organiza‐
tional management with not only member states but industries, and legal conflicts between
new MNA’s treaty/agreements and existing ones.
7. Conclusion
Even after Fu-NPP accident, use of nuclear reactors may be expanded particularly in emerg‐
ing countries, where reliable systems of fresh fuel supply as well as proper management of
spent fuels, free of any political disruptions to their nuclear reactors, are highly desirable.
Establishment of international cooperative systems, which includes services for fresh fuel
supply, spent fuel take-back/take-away, interim storage, reprocessing, and possibly reposi‐
tory disposal, may be able to contribute to a) enhancement of 3S, nuclear non-proliferation
(Safeguards), Safety, and Security, b) economic rationality, c) promotion of confidence-
building, and d) prevention to the occurrence of unfair business such as government-to-gov‐
ernment transaction based on cradle-to-grave service that nuclear weapon state’s privilege
enables. This kind of internationally cooperative framework may become essential for future
sustainable utilization of nuclear power.
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